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Abstract—Optical networks are prone to power jamming
attacks intending service disruption. This paper presents a
Machine Learning (ML) framework for detection and prevention
of jamming attacks in optical networks. We evaluate various
ML classifiers for detecting out-of-band jamming attacks with
varying intensities. Numerical results show that artificial neural
network is the fastest (106 detection per second) for inference and
most accurate (≈ 100%) in detecting power jamming attacks as
well as identifying the optical channels attacked. We also discuss
and study a novel prevention mechanism when the system is
under active jamming attacks. For this scenario, we propose
a novel resource reallocation scheme that utilizes the statistical
information of attack detection accuracy to lower the probability
of successful jamming of lightpaths while minimizing lightpaths’
reallocations. Simulation results show that the likelihood of
jamming a lightpath reduces with increasing detection accuracy,
and localization reduces the number of reallocations required.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical Networks have long been known as vulnerable to
different types of attacks, including power jamming attacks
[1]. The jamming attacks are usually launched by inserting a
relatively high power signal over either a frequency within
the transmission window (in-band jamming) or out of the
transmission band (out-of-band jamming) of legitimate data
channels. Both types of jamming are common and can disrupt
communication or even steal information with the help of
crosstalk mechanism. The out-of-band jamming can be harder
to detect under some circumstances, where the power of the
jamming channel does not differ much than the legitimate
channels. Furthermore, an out-of-band jamming signal at an
erbium-doped amplifier (EDFA) can cause gain competition
and starve legitimate signals from amplification. When a
relatively high power signal passes through multiple EDFAs
along its route in wavelength-division multiplexed (WDM)
networks, it accumulates higher amplified spontaneous emis-
sion noise and fiber nonlinear interference noise. These phe-
nomena lead to signal degradation in terms of optical signal-
to-noise ratio (OSNR) and bit error rate (BER) [2].
Previous work proposed attack prevention mechanisms
based on data encryption, quantum key distribution, and
scrambling techniques [3]–[6]. While these methods are hard
to break, attackers can still try to launch signal insertion and
splitting attacks without being noticed. Therefore, an attack
detection – in addition to prevention itself – is fundamentally
important as well. Currently, network operators rely on power
detection, spectrum analysis, reflectometry methods and man-
ual analysis by technicians for the jamming detection. But
given the heterogeneity in network devices and technologies,
these methods are prone to errors under noisy condition and
may lead to low detection rates or prolonged detection delays
[7]. With increasing data rate of today’s cloud-centric optical
networks, attack detection, localization (i.e., identification of
an attacked channel) in real time are highly desired but also
challenging. To this end, machine learning (ML) has recently
gained significant attention as a statistical method and a viable
solution to attack detection to address the issues of attack
detection and prevention in real time and accurately [8]. [9]
applied support vector machine as a ML technique to detect
jamming with 100% accuracy under a strong attack. However,
a detailed study of the effectiveness of various ML solutions
to detecting jamming attacks under a wider range of jamming
intensity is still missing. Equally important problems to be
addressed are attack localization and prevention.
This paper, therefore, studies the effectiveness of various
ML solutions to detection, localization and prevention of
power jamming attacks in optical networks. For detection and
localization of out-of-band power jamming attacks in WDM
networks, we first comparatively study the performance of
various ML techniques, such as artificial neural networks
(ANN), support vector machine (SVM), logistic regression
(LR), K-nearest neighbors (KNN), decision tree (DT) and
Naive Bayesian (NB). We also discuss jamming attack pre-
vention and study the scenario of an active jamming attack.
We show that after detecting an attack, reallocation of routes
and wavelengths to all lighpaths leads to low probability of
continuous and future jamming or observing of legitimate data
signals carried by authorized lightpaths (LP). The challenge
with the reallocation scheme is to use a few reconfigurations
(through resource reallocation process) as possible, so that the
services do not get unnecessarily disrupted. Thus, utilizing
the attack localization feature, we reallocate resources to
those lighpaths that are within the influence (attack radius)
of jamming channels. Our analysis shows that a single recon-
figuration in a LP’s lifetime or around 8% reconfigurations
are sufficient to secure LPs, while ANN and SVM are the
most suitable for attack detection and localization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents a ML framework for attack detection and prevention.
Section III presents data extraction method for a WDM net-
work scenario, attack prevention mechanism, and performance
evaluation. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IV.
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Fig. 1: A jamming attack detection and prevention framework.
II. ML-BASED ATTACK DETECTION AND PREVENTION
The proposed ML framework for detection and prevention
of jamming attacks in optical networks is shown in Fig.
1. The framework consists of an optical network under a
jamming attack, a network controller to monitor and recon-
figure physical devices, and attack detection and prevention
modules. The network controller collects optical performance
monitoring data from transceivers and switches, and stores
in a Knowledge Base. The controller could trigger an attack
detection procedure regularly or reactively upon detecting
new/suspicions data. A Detection Module then applies dif-
ferent ML techniques for detection of jamming attacks, and
in case of an attack it triggers a Localization Module to
identify the jammed channel using a localization algorithm.
It is important to mention that the Localization Module is
generally designed to find the position of the attacker, however
a network-wide attack monitoring is generally complex, and
exact locations of attacks might be difficult to identify in
real networks. Thus, the studied localization is limited to the
jammed channel. Using the attack detection and localization
information, the state of network security can be analyzed, and
the controller can apply the best security appliance proposed
by a Scheme Recommender for attack prevention.
A. Jamming Attack Model
The out-of-band jamming attacks in WDM networks gen-
erally require physical access to legitimate network access
points, such as transmitter, coupler, optical cross-connect
(OXC), etc. For simplicity, we define the power jamming
attack as the ability of an unauthorized user to sneak into the
network and access a light source (laser) to launch a signal
with higher power than other authorized wavelength channels,
targeting nonlinearity in the fiber and degradation of OSNR
and BER of other neighboring channels. We distinguish
between two types of user: authorized users, characterized
by transmitter sources which generate optical signals with a
defined signal power, and unauthorized users (jammers), char-
acterized by transmitter sources with higher power signals.
Fig. 1 also illustrates our jamming attack model that we
simulated to evaluate a jamming attack, as well as its detection
and prevention in an optical WDM network with three OXCs,
four transmitters and a WDM receiver. Transmitter 1 illus-
trates authorized users and an unauthorized user in a WDM
system, where the authorized sources in a WDM transmitter
send signals with power P1, and an unauthorized signal is
inserted by a Jammer in the 2nd channel with ε dB higher
power than the legitimate WDM channels. As shown in Fig.
1, signals are multiplexed using a WDM Mux, then amplified
with an EDFA during the transmission before switched by
an OXC to another fiber on its route. At the end, optical
receivers and BER Analyzers can be used for monitoring of
received signals. A WDM Analyzer is connected before the
WDM Demux to capture different features of all channels,
e.g., signal power, noise power, SNR or OSNR. These features
are analyzed to detect whether there is a jamming attack in a
network using a detection algorithm, and an attacked channel
is identified using a localization algorithm.
B. Detection and Localization Formulation with ML
The jamming detection/localization in optical networks can
be formulated as a classification problem, which can be
solved by typical supervised ML classifiers, such as ANN,
DT, KNN, SVM, LR and NB. Therefore, we compare and
evaluate these classifiers under a network scenario to find the
most accurate technique for the attack detection framework.
In order to use ML for jamming detection, we need to first
collect data for training of ML classifiers. The data represent
instances of a network where a jamming attack could happen.
For each instance, an input represents measured features
and output corresponds to a binary variable indicating the
presence/absence of an attack. We collect the information
about two features: received channel power and OSNR. We
monitor theses features by a WDM Analyzer.
Let’s assume that there are T WDM transmitters in a
network. An ith, 1 6 i 6 T transmitter could establish
W number of LPs to a single WDM receiver over wave-
lengths λi1 6 λiw 6 λiW with equivalent channel power
P iw = P
i, 1 6 w 6 W . Let’s assume that a Jammer J
can insert an unauthorized signal over any of the T × W
unused wavelengths with a power P J = P i + , where
1 dB 6  6 3 dB. A received signal before demultiplexing
corresponding to a wavelength channel λiw is denoted by
RSλiw = (f
1
λiw
, ..., fmλiw
), where fmλiw is the m
th feature of
the received signal over the channel λiw. In our study, we
consider received signal power and OSNR of each channel
as features for the detection and localization modules. Let’s
consider that we have multiple instances (NI ) of the network
in Fig 1. An instance of the network generates one data point
n where Xn = (RS1, ..., RST×W ) is the input data. For the
Detection Module the output Yn = 1 if there is a jamming
and 0 otherwise, and for the Localization Module the output
Yn = λ
i
w if the channel λ
i
w is jammed and Yn = 0 if
there is no attack. It is important to mention that various ML
techniques utilized for detecting jamming attacks use the same
dataset consisting of input samples, each having a feature
vector with length T ×W , i.e., Xn ∈ RT×W , 1 6 n 6 NI .
C. Discussion on Attack Prevention
The behavior of jamming attacks depends on the goal of
an attacker and his/her ability to access the network, which
is hard to predict. Proposing only one prevention scheme
can work in a specific scenario for which the scheme is
designed and fail for other scenarios. A jammer can be
smart and aware of the security system by using intelligent
attack strategy: jamming with interruption, periodically or
random attacks, or varying attack location. Another design
problem is related to the complexity of an attack prevention
scheme in terms of time and cost. Being aware of these
dynamic problems, the Scheme Recommender can select an
appropriate prevention scheme based on the attacker’s location
and the history of attacks stored in the Knowledge Base. In a
general case, the Scheme Recommender recommend the best
security appliance using information provided by the Security
Analysis. Studying the behavior of a jammer and analyzing
different security scenarios is out of the scope of this paper.
Here, we mainly discuss a preliminary security scenario in
which a network is under an active jamming attack without
knowing the position of an attacker. We aim to minimize the
number of channels affected by an attack. To this end, we
propose to periodically change the optical resources allocated
to maintain optical channels between a source-destination
pair, called as lightpaths (LPs), using a resource reallocation
strategy. The proposed attack prevention scheme is a proactive
approach, in which the network controller can inquire about
the network status regularly with mean interarrival time τr,
and as a response the attack detection and localization tool
sends the likelihood of a network being attacked. The attack
prevention scheme utilizes only the attack detection and
localization probabilities, and based on these information it
tries to reallocate optical resources to all or only a few LPs,
such that an attacker or a group of attackers is unable to jam
or have continuous access to authorized LPs.
III. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We use an Optisystem software to simulate a jamming
attack, and generate experimental datasets, which are used
for training and testing of ML algorithms for detecting and
localizing a jamming attack in a WDM network scenario
shown in Fig. 1. There are in total 32 optical channels
from four WDM transmitters to a single WDM receiver over
their shortest fiber-level paths. In other words, each WDM
transmitter establishes 8 LPs. For the simulation, we replace
OXCs with power combiners, since the input signals (e.g.,
from Transmitter 1 and 2) at an OXC are destined for the
same destination and traverses over the same fiber-level path
thereafter. Thus, Fiber link 5 is removed for the simulation.
The starting channel frequency at Transmitter 1 is 193.1 THz
and the channel spacing is equal to 100 GHz. Each WDM
transmitter is connected to a WDM Mux with 1 dB insertion
loss. The power of the multiplexed LPs coming from the first
and fourth WDM transmitters is amplified with EDFAs of
5 m length, and two EDFAs of 2 m are used to amplify
the power of the LPs coming from the second and third
WDM transmitters. We set the noise center frequency of each
EDFA to the frequency corresponding to central channel of
the multiplexed LPs. Thereafter, the amplified LPs coming
from EDFA 1 and EDFA 4 are connected to an optical fiber
of 50 km length with 0.28 dB/km attenuation loss. The light
from the Fiber 1 is combined with the amplified LPs from
EDFA 2 using a power combiner. Similarly, we combine the
LPs coming from fiber 2 and EDFA 3. After each combiner,
the LPs are amplified using an EDFA of 5 m length then they
travel a 70 km optical fiber. Afterward, we combine all LPs
with a power combiner to get 32 multiplexed LPs. Finally,
we amplify the LPs which traverse over an optical fiber of 50
km length before being demultiplexed by a WDM Demux and
connected to separate optical receivers. A WDM Analyzer is
used to extract the data related to each channel before the
WDM Demux. We designate an optical transmitter source as
a Jammer, which inserts an unauthorized signal with higher
power. Moreover, the Jammer can select one of the 32 light
sources in order to increase localization complexity.
The power of each transmitter is set to a value between -22
and 0 dBm so that the received power of channels are close to
each others, i.e., more power is given to such LPs that travel
longer paths (relative to the 1st and 4th transmitters). The
power of transmitters is varied in the defined range (-22 and
0 dBm) to creating enough and diverse data samples for the
evaluation of ML algorithms. We use an Optisystem simulator
to simulate various instances of authorized and unauthorized
data samples, where each instance of generating a data sample
takes around 20 to 25 minutes.
A. Jamming Attack Detection
For evaluating the jamming detection capability without
localization, the transmission power is varied for generat-
ing 3 types of datasets that store different percentage of
authorized and unauthorized samples: (50%–50%), (70%–
30%) and (90%–10%). We analyze the detection on different
Fig. 2: Detection accuracy per alg. for 50-50% sampling.
datasets with different proportions of unauthorized samples
to understand the effect of the jamming frequency on the
detection accuracy. The unauthorized samples are generated
by inserting higher power in one of the following channels:
channel number 7, 13 and 27. The number of data points in the
(50%–50%) dataset is 1140. As explained in Section II, each
input sample holds the received power and OSNR information
of all 32 channels. Each dataset is divided into training and
testing sets with proportion of 75% and 25% respectively.
We first evaluate the overall accuracy of different detection
algorithms (ANN, DT, KNN, SVM, LR and NB) for the
Detection Module and analyze its two main components: True
Positive (TP) rate as the probability of correct detection of
jamming attacks, and True Negative (TN) rate as the right
recognition of the normal behavior. We present the accuracy
of each ML algorithm by averaging testing results with 20
different seeds. All algorithms are implemented in Python
and use Scikit-learn library. The ANN is fully connected
with one hidden layer, increasing hidden layers does not
improve accuracy, and a well-known L-BFGS is used as
an optimizer. We consider only one neighbor for KNN,
increasing k-neighbors decreased the accuracy, and the inverse
of regularization strength is set to 0.1 in LR. Moreover, we
considered the Gaussian NB, and use the default parameters
provided by scikit-learn implementation of SVM, LR and DT.
Fig. 2 depicts the performance of different algorithms in
terms of accuracy, TP rate and TN rate with equal proportion
of authorized and unauthorized data samples, i.e., 50-50%
sampling. Except SVM, the accuracy under other algorithms
is nearly same when both features are used rather than the
power alone. The reason is that the jamming attack is realized
by inserting a relatively higher power. Therefore, the received
Fig. 3: Performance of algorithms with different sampling.
ANN DT KNN SVM LR NB
Mean Training Time (ms)/ 1000 samples 76.697 28.65 0.902 45.951 6.233 1.861
Mean Testing Time (ms)/ 1000 samples 0.529 0.6 10.235 35.585 4.389 19.014
Fig. 4: Mean execution time for jamming detection
signal power is enough to model the jamming attack in optical
networks. When we use the signal power alone as a feature,
we see in Fig. 2 that ANN outperforms other algorithms
with an accuracy of 99.1%. LR, KNN, SVM and DT show
an accuracy around 90%. The NB technique is the worst
candidate for detecting jamming attacks with an accuracy of
56% which means that the result is statistically analogous to
a random selection in the case of a binary classification, i.e.
50% to select 1 and 50% to select 0.
In Fig. 3 we compare the performance of ML algorithms
considering two other datasets of 70-30% and 90-10% sam-
pling, where the received power is used as the only feature.
We observe that ANN outperforms all other algorithms in
different scenarios with an accuracy equal to 100%. NB is
still the worst technique for the detection problem in terms
of accuracy. The accuracy of all other algorithms (DT, KNN,
SVM and LR) is between 80% and 92%, and their TN rates
decrease for 70-30% and 90-10 %. For SVM, the TN rate
is equal to 48.9% for 70-30% sampling and 58.1% for 90-
10% sampling. In general, ANN is the only algorithm in the
evaluated scenario that has a stable performance with different
sampling strategies. For other algorithms, the TN rate is lower
than 86% in 90-10% sampling. Furthermore, from Figs. 2
and 3 we observe that the accuracy of ML algorithms could
increase when the amount of authorized samples is increased
in the dataset. The reason is that the TP rate increases with
increasing proportions of authorized samples (from 50% to
90%). On the other hand, the TN rate decreases sharply for
most of ML algorithms when the percentage of unauthorized
signals is decreased in the dataset Additionally, the training
time of ANN is longer than other evaluated ML techniques,
ANN DT KNN SVM LR NB
Accuracy 99.5 87.05 85.1 99.2 98.1 22.7
TP rate
no attack 100 61.6 84.7 97.9 52.3 5.1
channel 1 100 92.2 80.2 100 100 8.3
channel 19 97.9 86.6 89.2 97.1 97.1 30
channel 28 100 78.4 83.3 100 100 10.6
Mean Training Time (ms)/1000  samples 1227.2 87.05 85.1 99.2 98.1 22.7
Mean Testing Time (ms)/1000  samples 0.96 0.61 14.54 33.97 3.71 12.89
Fig. 5: Performance of algorithms for jamming localization
meanwhile its testing time is the shortest. Using a CPU intel
i5-6500, 3.20GHz, we evaluate the training and testing time
for the 6 ML algorithms. Fig. 4 shows that ANN can take 0.5
ms to evaluate 1000 samples and take 76.6 ms to train the
model with 1000 samples. The fast evaluation time of ANN
makes it the most suitable for implementation.
B. Jamming Attack Localization
Along with attack detection, it is equally important to locate
it. However, locating the sources or access points of attacks
is generally complicated and out-of-scope of this paper. We
evaluate a single channel attack detection with localization
in a network described before. For the training, we generate
46 samples for every possible jammed channel by varying the
power of the legitimate light sources from 0 to -20 dB and the
jamming power which is 1,2 and 3 dB higher. We generate
also a set of authorized samples to make the Localization
Module aware of the misclassification that can be produced by
the Detection Module. We use 46 samples for the authorized
dataset to have equal number of samples per class which are
33 classes in our case (32 channels + authorized class). The
number of data samples in the dataset is 1518. Again, the
dataset is divided into training and testing sets with proportion
of 75% and 25% respectively. We evaluate the accuracy of the
6 algorithms with different setups for the attack localization
and analyze TP rate for each channel (i.e., whether an attacked
channel is identified correctly or not). More importantly, we
use 20 hidden layers for ANN, since lowering the number
of hidden layers reduces the localization accuracy. We use
a linear kernel for SVM. Confusion matrix is a tool used
to analyze the performance of the classifier on every class.
We analyzed the confusion matrix of each algorithm and
show the main results represented by the TP rate of some
classes. Fig. 5 shows the localization accuracy and TP rate
of some selected channels using different algorithms. ANN
and SVM show the best result of 99% accuracy and around
99% TP rate for all channels. LR has an accuracy 98% while
the TP rate for the class ”no attack” is 52.3% which means
that when the Detection Module misclassify a sample, the
Localization Module will have only 52.3% chance to discover
this misclassification and 47.7% chance to alert the Controller
that an attack occurred in a wrong channel. DT and KNN have
an accuracy around 86% which is a low accuracy compared
to ANN and SVM. NB is a very bad solution which cannot
be considered in our problem.
Based on the accuracy results, it is interesting to compare
the time performance of ANN and SVM to be able to decide
which method fits better in a real implementation. Fig. 5
shows that ANN is much faster than SVM in the inference
phase, while it takes more than 10 times longer to be trained.
Because the training process is usually running in an off-line
mode, it is more important to consider the inference time for
the decision which makes ANN again the best option for the
localization of a jamming attack being able to evaluate 106
sample per second.
C. A Case Study of Attack Prevention
Let us assume that the reallocation requests arrive with
exponentially distributed mean interarrival time τr. If we
assume that the holding time of LPs is also exponentially
distributed with mean τc, then it can be easily shown that the
number of arrivals of reallocation requests during the lifetime
of an authorized LP is τcτr . However, a reallocation process is
only performed with the attack detection probability pa, which
means the average number of reconfigurations performed
during the lifetime of the LP would reduce to Nr = τcτr pa.
As Nr number of reconfigurations of the LP during its
lifetime τc can be divided into Nr + 1 parts, each part is
approximately given as ∆t = τcNr+1 [6]. Assuming that one
or more attackers can jam or observe authorized LPs in their
proximity, that means to left and right of unauthorized LPs.
The amount of successfully jammed data of an authorized LP
with a data rate of b bits per unit time in the first interval is
b∆t × pj , where pj is the probability that a LP is jammed
in an interval ∆t. Furthermore, in each of the following Nr
intervals, the amount of successfully jammed data of the LP
is b∆t × pj × pc, where pc is the probability that the LP is
jammed without an interruption at each reallocation. We can
obtain these probability terms (pj and pc) by simulating all
(re)allocation instances by an event simulator. Therefore, the
amount of data successfully jammed in the LP’s lifetime is
b∆t×pj [1 +Nr × pc]. Moreover, the amount of data carried
by the same LP during its lifetime is b× τc = b∆t(Nr + 1).
Thus, we define a security metric by finding the probability
of unsuccessful jamming of an authorized LP, which is given
by one minus the ratio of successfully jammed data and total
carried data per authorized LP, and it is obtained by Eq. (1).
Λj = 1− pj
1 + τcτr papc
1 + τcτr pa
(1)
A preliminary result of the attack prevention mechanism
is shown in Fig. 6, which illustrates the effect of the mean
reallocation time (τr) and detection accuracy (pa) on the
security of LPs (Λj), as defined by Eq. (1). This result
is obtained in a well known 14-node NSFNET topology
with two shortest paths per node pair, and the number of
wavelength channels per link is 80. We generated two types of
LP requests, authorized and unauthorized, with a single wave-
length demand. The source-destination pair for a LP request is
uniformly selected among all node pairs, and the requests are
generated with exponential mean 200 requests per unit time,
and their holding times are exponentially distributed with
mean τc = 10 time units. The reallocation control events are
generated with exponential mean τr, and it is varied as shown
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Fig. 6: Unsuccessful jamming probability in NSFNET.
in the horizontal axis in Fig. 6. We obtained the probability of
jamming per reallocation interval (pj) as the ratio of number
of jammed interval per authorized LP to the total intervals
through a discrete event simulation. Similarly, the probability
of jamming without interruption pc in a reallocation interval
is calculated by the ratio of the number of instances where
reallocation effect is absent (i.e., a LP is jammed without
interruption) to the total reallocation instances. In Fig. 6, we
see that the data security of LPs against jamming decreases ex-
ponentially with the mean reallocation time τr. Furthermore,
when the mean reallocation time is equal to the mean lifetime
of authorized LPs, i.e., τr = τc = 10, the security decreases
only by 3% for detection accuracy of 100%, which means
even one reconfiguration in the lifetime of a LP is enough
to secure 97% of LPs against jamming attacks. Therefore,
traffic disruption caused by the reallocation scheme is limited
by limiting the required number of reallocations per LP. With
lower attack detection accuracy and with increasing number
of unauthorized LPs in the network, the security against the
jamming attacks decreases.
To improve the proposed attack prevention mechanism, we
consider the localization accuracy of jamming. The knowledge
about the location of an unauthorized LP allows us to just
block it as a reactive solution. However, an authorized LP
might be blocked due to an error from the localization
module. To prevent blocking of authorized LPs, we propose
to reconfiguring only such authorized LPs that could be
affected by jammed (unauthorized) channels. However, when
the localization module incorrectly detects a jammed channel,
reconfiguring the LPs on neighboring channels of an identified
unauthorized LPs won’t prevent the actual jammed channel,
which might exist on another location, from affecting the
network. To consider this case, our optimized mechanism
reconfigure only the neighboring channels with a probability
pl and reconfigure all channels with probability 1−pl, where
pl is the overall localization accuracy. Fig. 7 shows the
number of reconfigurations required per detection triggered by
a controller for attack prevention with and without localization
feature. We observe that better the localization accuracy is,
less we need to reconfigure LPs. However, reconfigurations
increase with the increase in detection accuracy when we
don’t have the information about the attack’s location. The
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Fig. 7: Reconfigurations required per attack detection.
reason is that reconfiguration (Nr) increases linearly with the
detection accuracy (Pa in Eq. 1). As a result, with localization,
around 8% of LPs require reconfigurations to secure LPs as
compared to the reconfigurations needed using detection only
(for 90% accuracy).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a ML framework for detecting
and preventing jamming attacks in optical networks. We stud-
ied the effectiveness of various ML techniques by providing a
comparative and detailed analysis using different metrics, such
as attack detection accuracy, true positive and negative rates.
We find that ANN is the most accurate approach in terms of
accuracy and time complexity to detecting and localizing out-
of-band power jamming attacks. Furthermore, we discussed
the design of an attack prevention mechanism and studied a
security scenario for active jamming attacks by applying a
resource reallocation scheme to take preventive actions, and
which is shown to improving data security in optical networks.
We believe that machine learning-assisted attack detection can
be easily integrated in a real optical network, and we plan to
further work on a robust attack prevention scheme in future.
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